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Abstract 
Project Management and Cost Engineering have made tremendous advances but we still witness all too frequent severe budget 
overruns and delays. A solution to this mega problem of budget overruns actually exists. Use of the Successive Principle has 
demonstrated this during the later decennials. It has demonstrated in tough practice that it is possible to make accurate, unbiased 
statistical prognoses of the factual project cost or other important key figures. The results reported here may be surprising, given 
the well-known history of cost overrun. In Scandinavia these principles have been widely accepted by top management and 
authorities. It has improved professional project management. A proper documentation is recently available in the form of two 
independent datasets of major public projects. This documentation and the key principles are summarised in this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Project Management (PM) and Cost Engineering (CE) have made tremendous advances during many decades. 
Nevertheless, we still witness all too frequent severe budget overruns and delays, especially among larger projects. 
Many authors have documented this. This introduction does not grant room to give a complete overview of this 
theme, but gives a brief overview as background for presenting successful recent results from Scandinavia.  
Internationally the most referred source for claiming project cost overrun is the famous Standish Group (2004) 
“Chaos report”. It shows depressing results in a large sample of ICT-projects, and this source is not alone in 
claiming most projects go wrong. Other credible sources include Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl (2002, 2003). Their result 
of a large analysis was that 90% of an international set of large projects had cost overruns, generally of a significant 
size. They also found significant overestimations of project benefit. They further documented that no improvement 
could be seen over many decades. This dataset is dominated by public megaprojects. Merrow (2011) documents that 
the situation is not much better in private sector: 65-75% of industrial megaprojects fail on business targets. Based 
on 318 industrial megaprojects his analysis indicates that there are seven recurring reasons for failure, among these 
are cutting corners and spending too little time and effort in the front end. The projects in the analyses above are 
generally large and complex. This makes the question of size interesting – does size matter? Odeck (2004) studied 
this by analyzing a complete sample of all public road projects in Norway for a 3 year period (1992-1995) – a total 
of 620 projects. His results indicate that small projects have even worse results than large projects – the cost overrun 
was even more frequent and relatively larger in small projects. On the positive side, he also documented that the 
total share of projects having cost overrun and the average size of overrun was less than indicated in international 
studies. To summarize this; we know for a fact that historically projects have had a strong tendency for cost overrun 
– large or small, private or public – and over time.  
Similarly, the studies on cost overrun also look for reasons behind the cost overrun (and corresponding benefit 
underperformance). Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2003) argues that a main problem is that planners and promoters often 
deliberately underestimate costs and risks and overestimate the benefits in order to increase the likelihood that their 
project gets approval and funding. This view is supported by other studies as well – there are political or strategic 
reasons for cost overrun. Similar reasons are identified by Merrow (2011) in business projects, and in addition he 
point to inadequate cost estimation and risk assessments. We know that there are strategic and tactical reasons for 
projects to experience cost overrun and benefits underperformance. These reasons need to be understood and 
handled well to improve PM performance. 
Another set of reasons for cost overrun are known to stem from human judgment, as documented by Kahneman 
& Tversky (1979) and later excellently explained by Kahneman (2011). Lange (1985) disclosed this reason in a 
master’s thesis: Subjective expert evaluations are typically biased by several psychological pitfalls. A well-known 
scientific paradigm is typical for engineering culture; to focus only upon documentary matters, and avoid dealing 
with subjective, non-documentary matters. Consequently, subjective matters were considered only superficial if at 
all included. Despite scientific methods for cost estimation did exist, a still larger part of a budget or schedule rested 
upon subjective expert evaluations. Inspired by this observation Lange identified from psychological literature more 
than 20 pitfalls when making such quantitative evaluations. This was an eye-opener in Scandinavia and initiated a 
different way of thinking about how cost estimation should be done in practice.  
Traditional tools and techniques for project planning and management were based on deterministic logic, 
although leading scholars early realized this was not sufficient. When theory tried to cope with uncertainty in these 
traditional methods, it became very complicated. The tools became increasingly challenging, especially for small 
organizations. Uncertainty was seen as almost impossible to handle, while using the classical statistical theories 
towards planning and estimating the fuzzy future. The existing procedures were either too primitive or too difficult 
to operate. This realization sparked a development in Denmark in the early 1970’s that initiated the story reported in 
the next section of this paper. 
2. Untraditional research efforts during the 70s and 80s 
Successful results in scheduling during the 1960s came from the use of the Program Evaluation Review 
Technique, PERT, one of the well-known Critical Path Methods. It introduced the triple estimate to measure 
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uncertain data. Provoked by the many project budget overruns, the idea of using similar logic was introduced in the 
1970s towards cost estimates. It was a research effort aiming more realistic project estimates, led by the second 
author of this paper at the Technical University of Denmark, DTU.  
The research soon met the difficulties of operative handling the uncertainty. It was complex as a bunch of keys 
including numeral statistical dependencies. This problem was solved by isolating and defining all significant 
dependencies among the individual cost items into contingency items. In this manner, all items are largely 
statistically independent of each other. Another problem was to cope with the huge amount of data, and their 
uncertainty. This was solved while using a consistent top - down principle. The estimate procedure starts with a set 
of 8 to 12 physical main items covering the whole scope, and a similar number of contingency items. The estimators 
evaluate triple estimates of each of these. The total cost is calculated while using normal statistical rules. The 
specific effect from each uncertain item upon the total uncertainty is established as a “top ten list”. 
The most uncertain local item at the top of the list by nature is the most critical for the total result. This element is 
therefore subject to further clarification. The calculation is then updated and a new top ten list appears. The 
procedure continues after this first step with further successive steps (re: the term “Successive Principle” or “the 
Stepwise Method”) as long as the total uncertainty is reduced sufficiently. Surprisingly soon all major local 
uncertainties has been clarified as much as possible. The end result - due to the 20/80 rule - will typically hold only 
less than a hundred items and factors, often down to 30-40. 
A prototype of the procedure was launched locally in Denmark during the 1970s and published by Lichtenberg 
(1971, 1974). Its obvious advances made it soon widespread locally in Denmark. However, it suffered from severe 
failures due to the many pitfalls when estimators make subjective evaluations. The results suffered from this and the 
use after some time gradually faded out in Denmark. During the 1980s, this severe problem was solved. Nils Lange 
(1985) sparked new development, when he identified more than 20 relevant psychological pitfalls from a study of 
international psychological literature. Spetzler & Staël von Holstein (1975) and Tversky & Kahneman (1983) 
among others. He also made some advices on how to bypass them. 
The further development effort took place in an untraditional tight binational cooperation between researchers 
from Statistical theory, Psychology and Engineering Economy. It was based at the Technical Universities of 
Denmark respectively Norway, led by the second author and the late professor Reidar Hugsted and his team, 
respectively. This was soon supplied with the Norwegian professor of psychology, Karl Halvor Teigen (Brun & 
Teigen, 1988; Teigen, 1988). With Norway as the leading partner, this final research largely solved the remaining 
problems before the end of the 1980s. The resulting procedure is further developed in section 3.  
3. The resulting new procedure 
In 1990 the research effort resulted in a procedure, which proved most successful (Klakegg, 1993; Lichtenberg, 
2000). Its immediate primary applications were as a quality tool towards budget and schedules of larger projects. 
Besides being able to forecast surprisingly accurate future final results, it identified and ranked the major 
optimization options. It has been used to augment the productivity considerably and is summarized as follows.  
The central part is a workshop of typically two full days. It has to be prepared and guided by a facilitator. He/she 
should have a profound knowledge of the procedure and not least the evaluation techniques and its biases. A 
workshop group is established of 7 - 15 experts and generalists; competent and with a broad and balanced 
composition. The ensuing group sessions make full use of the participant’s pooled expertise, experience, intuition 
and group synergy. In short, the full range of the brainpower of the assembled participants. The composition will 
help moderate some of the evaluation biases. At least one of the participants should be from outside the project, if 
possible outside the company, or in other ways be able to function as "the devil's advocate” in order to balance any 
over-optimism. The physical conditions should be well prepared, and the culture needs to support an open attitude 
among the participants. 
After having reached agreement as to its point of departure, its goal and the specific analysis procedure, a 
qualitative brainstorming process follows, allowing the group first to identify - spontaneously and without any ”no-
go areas” - all possible overall uncertain issues. These are then grouped to a smaller number (8 to 12) of discrete and 
mutually independent main groups of contingencies. For each main group a basic, historical oriented and normalized 
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precondition is defined for use in the following quantification of the physical items. Another definition for each 
main group of contingencies describes the actual expected future situation of the case project. This latter is used 
during the following quantification process of the contingency items. Any “either/or” risks of catastrophes, accidents 
or the like are set aside for a separate risk analysis. Initially merely 10 - 15 physical main items are used to cover the 
total cost, normally based upon a conventional estimating procedure. To this structure, we add a series of 
contingency items, namely the above defined 8 - 12 overall groups of contingency issues. 
To assure the workshop group makes correct subjective judgments of the cost in the subsequent quantitative 
analysis, use the following estimating procedure, called the Group Triple Estimate or GTE procedure. It is 
documented to be able to largely compensate for the many evaluation pitfalls if “the rules of the game” are carefully 
followed. These set of rules are thoroughly described in Lichtenberg (2000). Only the main aspects are described 
here: 
Before the quantification, the workshop group will briefly discuss the subject matter, particularly the scope and 
defined preconditions of each item, but strictly without mentioning any figures. Then, in complete silence, all 
participants concentrate and find their own intuitive personal triple estimates and write them down. Conferring is not 
permitted in this phase.  
A triple estimate consists of an extreme low and an extreme high value followed by a “most likely” value. In the 
following quantification process, one triple estimate is made for each of the physical main items based on the 
historical base preconditions, and for each of the supplementary contingency items. The latter quantification is based 
upon the difference between the base precondition and the definition of the perceived actual situation. The extreme 
values are evaluated before the most likely ones to avoid one of the biases. Using the most extreme values among all 
participants compensate for a serious pitfall of underestimating the low and high values. The statistical calculations 
of the first result are completed without contravening the natural laws of uncertainty (the Bayesian statistical 
theory). Due to the established mutual independency, these calculations are both fairy simple and correct. The total 
result is calculated. It can be done manually, but to save time it is normally fed into a computer with one of the 
available software applications (see www.futuraone.com for more information).   
The top level result of these initial calculations identifies a ”top ten list” of the largest local sources of uncertainty 
from both the physical items and the contingency items. Those at the top of the top ten list - being the most critical 
ones - are further specified into independent sub items if possible. If this is not possible, the participants seeks to 
“bring on the table” supplementary relevant information to clarify the situation. The relevant sub items or the 
original item is re-evaluated while using the GTE procedure again.  
A re-calculation follows and an updated top ten list appears besides the total mean and standard deviation. The 
previous clarification step is repeated successively until the total result is sufficiently stable. The well-known “20-80 
rule” comes emphatically into effect here and therefore only relatively few steps are typically required before all the 
predominant sources of uncertainty have been addressed and clarified as much as possible. At this point of time, the 
participants are well equipped to suggest action plans for further optimization. Used as a management tool, this 
helps the project manager develop his PM strategy and optimize the situation.  
A number of specific variants of this procedure have been developed for a range of practical applications: Cost 
estimates, Schedule analyses, Benefit/Cost analyses, as well as for project optimization, obtaining consensus and 
team building. Examples are given in Klakegg (1993), Lichtenberg (2000), Samset & Volden (2013), Statens 
vegvesen (2014), Schrøder & Lichtenberg (2013), and www.lichtenberg.org.  
Schedules are basically analyzed according to the same procedure, but instead of a cost break down structure, a 
top level critical path network is used as a basis. It consists of 10 - 14 main activities or groups of activities. To this 
basic network, “contingency activities” are added at relevant places in the network plus one or several ones as end 
activities. They cover contingencies, which affect the plan as a whole. The first qualitative part of the procedure runs 
exactly as described above. The quantitative process uses the GTE procedure. The duration of all physical activities 
are evaluated under condition of the basic preconditions, as described above, while the duration of the contingency 
activities are evaluated according to the difference between the basic preconditions and the actual description of the 
specific situation. The following network calculations will normally be based on Monte Carlo simulations. Using the 
same Top-down procedure as above, any specification has the form of a sub net. 
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4. Documentation and experience 
The Successive Principle has been used internationally (www.futuraone.com) since 1990. However, first of all in 
Scandinavia (www.lichtenbeg.org) in most public and private spheres and for many different purposes (Archibald & 
Lichtenberg, 1992). Most intensively it is implemented in Norway (www.concept.ntnu.no), as documented in Aass, 
Jermstad, Aanes Johansen & Klakegg (2010) and Samset & Volden (2013). 
During three decades, up to a thousand of projects have been analyzed while using these principles with 
successful results. However, it has been hard to believe that it is actually possible to get full control over the budget 
and schedules of large projects. Therefore many previous examples of successful results have generally been 
explained as pure luck, perfect project management or the like. However, this capability to fully control the project 
outcome is for the first time recently properly documented from two independent series of large projects, 
summarized below. 
4.1. Norwegian major public projects since year 2000 
A governmental commission in 1999 evaluated the current practice in many governmental bodies. As a result, the 
commission suggested a budget quality audit based on these new principles (Berg, 1999). Since 2000 budget quality 
audits based on the Successive Principle has been obligatory for all large-scale Norwegian public-sector investment 
projects before final decision to finance and execute. The ambition was that from now on 80 % of the projects 
should keep to budget. Any higher ambition than 80 % was assumed too costly. By 2013, 40 of these projects of all 
categories were completed. An official report (Samset & Volden, 2013) published the result so far. The report shows 
that exactly 80 %, namely 32 of the 40 projects, kept to budget (see Figure 1a).  
4.2. Danish large road projects 2002-2007 
Over the period 2002 – 2007, the final costs of all large-scale Danish highway projects were estimated using the 
Successive Principle. By 2013 a significant number of projects were finished, and it was possible to compare the 
prognoses with the actual final costs for 40 of these analyses. The result is illustrated in figure 1b.  
 
The vertical scale indicates the number of projects, while the horizontal scale shows the difference between 
prognosticated mean value and the actual costs in proportion to the standard deviation. The overall result was well in 
agreement with both the mean values and the calculated uncertainty. However, the actual final costs were 
approximately seven percent lower than the calculated mean figure on average. Similarly, the actual spread was 
slightly below the calculated uncertainty. A likely reason is the fact that the project managers have capitalized on the 
potential optimization possibilities identified by the analyses. The reduced final costs as well as the slightly reduced 
Figure 1a Norwegian results from 40 major public 
investment projects (Samset & Volden, 2013) 
 
Figure 1b Danish results from 40 road projects. The 
prognoses are blue, and the factual results are red 
(Schrøder & Lichtenberg, 2014) 
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uncertainty are most likely a result of their subsequent action plans. More detailed results so far only appear in the 
Danish language at www.lichtenberg.org.These results document that by now there is good control with the cost of 
large infrastructure projects in Norway and road projects in Denmark from the GO/NO GO decision is made and 
until the projects are delivered.  
5. Discussion on theory and practice 
Typical feedback used to be surprise at how close the prognoses are to the actual results, which are subsequently 
achieved. This was most obvious in cases of project schedules. Today it is accepted as expected when large projects 
actually meet cost and time in Norway, Sweden, and to lesser degree in Denmark. However, any untraditional 
research which integrates different fields like Statistical theory, Psychology and Engineering Economy holds 
weaknesses, limitations and unsolved questions.  
Important benefits and solutions have materialized during the later decades of practical applications. The obvious 
strength lies partly in that unpleasant surprises now with great certainty can be significantly reduced and partly in 
the new opportunities for project efficiency and increased teamwork that this method helps uncover. Questions are 
asked before instead of after the fact. The weaknesses and limitations lie in having to comply with "the rules of the 
game" – some of them untraditional and for some participants provoking. It can for example only be useful in 
organizations with a modern management attitude, and a policy of internal openness. It requires courage and 
genuine will to meet the ‘naked truth’ of the task, whether it concerns schedules, budget proposals, financial 
analyses etc.   
It is a challenge in busy workdays to set up a sufficiently broad-based analysis group of key persons. Given the 
innovative character of the Successive Principle and the weight given to both qualitative and quantitative evaluation 
process, a considerable and demanding “running-in” period is needed, with the full, unequivocal backing of senior 
management. Even if this is obtainable; the process must be steered by a facilitator who has a good grasp of group 
dynamics, statistics and the use of the Successive Principle. They may be hard to find. 
A typical observed weakness is to compromise with a less relevant analysis group and accept of unprepared 
attendance. Even more serious is to focus solely on the physical items without sufficient regard to the overall 
general effects from the project environment, management, client, the current project situation, future development 
etc. Another typical weakness lies in handling the triple estimates correctly in the group. Unfortunately it is often 
seen that the well-documented significant underestimation of the max and min values is not properly compensated 
by using the most extreme values in the whole analysis group. 
The new principles have already been used in a broad field of applications. However some applications are so far 
at the experimental stage or even merely a potential. The use has shown considerable augments of the productivity. 
So far, this has been seen as a side effect. Improvement of the productivity as a primary goal of an analysis does still 
need further development and tests. The same is the case with quality reviews of Life Cycle Analyses as well as the 
use as proper risk analysis. Improvement of the accuracy of economical prognoses is just a potential application so 
far, however a most promising one. 
A large portfolio of public and private companies in Scandinavia and beyond consistently testifies to the benefits 
of using the Successive Principle. Many users liken the Successive Principle to a pair of “future- glasses” or to an 
“ultra-sound scan” of plans, estimates, budgets, etc. This is partly because of the specific and realistic picture of how 
matters will progress in terms of the budget or schedule and partly because of the ranked list of the most important 
external and internal sources of uncertainty. These consist of specific threat factors, hidden opportunities or simply 
grounds for uncertainty. The value of this list lies in allowing the client to take timely preventive or protective action 
against threats and to make the most of the positive opportunities in order to improve competitiveness, or simply to 
achieve greater efficiency. Control and optimization of major project schedules has been a particularly successful 
sphere of application. It has often been possible to accelerate timely.  
Johansen, Sandvin, Torp & Økland (2014) observes 5 challenges with today’s practice that still needs more 
attention in current Norwegian practice: 1) expressing the real uncertainty in very early phases of a project, 2) avoid 
digging too deep in details, 3) getting the standard deviation right (expressing the realistic uncertainty) in all phases 
of the project, 4) handling the human error and team effects (heuristics and group think) and understanding their 
effects, 5) avoid neglecting opportunities during the risk- and uncertainty analysis (we seem to have a blind spot for 
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opportunities). The Successive Principle addresses all these challenges, but even more improvements in practice are 
called for. We applaud such initiatives and suggest one specific improvement in the concluding part.  
The potential is huge, but it does not come for free. Significant investment in education of key individuals and 
training of facilitators is needed. So too is the development and implementation of organizational procedures to 
support and utilize the method.  
6. Conclusion and the way forward 
Project Management and Cost Engineering have made tremendous advances during many decades. Still we know 
that projects are often delivered too late and with severe cost overrun. This paper describes the development and 
result of a new method that challenges traditional ways of thinking about project planning and cost estimation. The 
results have been promising since the introduction in the 90’s but often explained away by referring to luck or other 
situational factors. Then finally in 2013 and 2014 came credible documentation that confirmed there is more than 
coincidence behind these results. The results are presented above: Good control with the cost of large infrastructure 
projects is established in Norway and Denmark using the Successive Principle.  
This documentation confirms we have come a long way, but still there are challenges for future development. 
Klakegg, Torp & Austeng (2010) observed that there are several challenges in making the analyses, methods and 
tools easy enough to give practical support to those that need it on one hand, and the ideal precision and advanced 
user interface on the other hand. There are real dilemmas in this development. Maybe there is no such thing as a 
perfect solution to this dilemma. 
One problem has the Successive Principle not yet solved. It is the remaining issue of cost escalation of large 
projects from the first idea and up to the point in time where the GO/NO GO decision is made. The Successive 
Principle is the best available method for estimating the cost from an inside view position. However, current practice 
shows that we need to strengthen even more the work in the earliest phases. Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests adding the 
outside view through Reference class forecasting. We believe this is a useful way of strengthening the earliest cost 
estimates. These two methods together form a complete toolset to secure realistic cost estimates even in a very early 
phase of development. However, more research and practical implementation is needed. The first attempts to use the 
outside view were introduced in Norway as part of external quality assurance, but complete reference class 
forecasting is not implemented yet. The authors will follow this development with excitement.  
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